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1 Introduction
There is a growing body of the economic and population ethics literatures concerned with
the demographic dimension of the sustainable growth debate (see for example, Arrow et al.,
2004). Clearly, if sustainability implies coping with the needs of current generations without
compromising those of the far future generations (i.e. the so-called Brundtland criterion),
the question of sustainable demographic paths, namely those which can achieve the latter
intergenerational fairness goal, comes easily into the story. Of course this question can be
easily connected to current hot environment-oriented issues: ceteris paribus, larger populations
are likely to pollute more and to deplete more quickly natural resources, which is a further
strong threat on sustainable development (see Boucekkine, Martinez and Ruiz-Tamarit, 2014).
Here, we strictly stick to the intergenerational fairness problem outlined by Arrow et al. (2004),
and abstract from the environmental ingredients.
The key question is indeed a basic and recurrent one in population ethics: what is the
optimal population size? By which social welfare ordering can we argue that the current
European or world population is suboptimal or not? Clearly this question can be asked with
or without the global warming threat. As recently outlined by Dasgupta (2005), the question
of optimal population size traces back to antiquity. For example, Plato concluded that the
number of citizens in the ideal city-state is 5,040, arguing that it is divisible by every number
up to ten and have as many as 59 divisors, which would allow for the population to “... suffice
for purposes of war and every peacetime activity, all contracts for dealings, and for taxes and
grants” (cited in Dasgupta, 2005).
The early related economic literature is due to Edgeworth (1925): he claimed that the use
of total utilitarianism (that’s the Benthamite social welfare function) is highly problematic
as it leads to choose a bigger population size (compared for example to the Millian social
welfare function or average utilitarianism) with quite lower standard of living. Some recent
inspections into this issue have reached the same conclusion. In particular, Nerlove, Razin and
Sadka (1985), who examined the robustness of Edgeworth’s claim to parental altruism within
a simple static model, found that the claim still holds when the utility function of adults is
increasing in the number of children and/or the utility of children. Interestingly enough, the
latter economic literature was contemporaneous (and probably sympathetic) to a masterpiece
of the population ethics literature, the 1984 Parfit’s Reasons and Persons book. In particular,
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Parfit explicitly attributed to total utilitarianism the same unpleasant implication as Edgeworth
60 years ago, and he called it a repugnant conclusion.
The use of dynamic frameworks to assess the repugnant conclusion and its correlates traces
back essentially to the 90s. Intriguingly, the settings considered were rooted in the endogenous
growth literature, a strongly rising stream at that time. Palivos and Yip (1993) and Razin
and Yuen (1995) are two excellent representatives of this literature. In particular, Palivos
and Yip showed that Edgeworth’s claim cannot hold in the framework of endogenous growth
driven by an AK production function. The determination of the optimal population growth
rate relies on the following trade-off: on one hand, the utility function depends explicitly on the
demographic growth rate; on the other, the latter induces the standard linear dilution effect on
capital accumulation, and therefore on economic growth. Palivos and Yip proved that in such a
case the Benthamite criterion leads to a smaller population size and a higher growth rate of the
economy provided the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lower than one. More recently,
Boucekkine and Fabbri (2013) have examined a more general AK framework with endogenous
demographic growth allowing for any type of correlation between demographic and economic
growth at equilibrium. This is made possible by considering a large class of dilution functions:
in particular, following Blanchet (1988) who proved that such functions are nonlinear when
accounting for the age structure of capital, Boucekkine and Fabbri found that the repugnant
conclusion would more easily arise under non-monotonic dilution schemes.
In Boucekkine and Fabbri (2013) and Palivos and Yip (1993), human populations do not
play any role in the production side of the economy since the assumed production function is
AK. Clearly, if humans do not produce, a strong pro-natalist ingredient is lost. What if the
size of population matters in the production function as in neoclassical growth? Things should
be much more involved. In the extreme case where the production function is AN (that’s only
human capital matters), Boucekkine, Fabbri and Gozzi (2014) show that the results depend
strongly on the humans’ life span. If the life span is large enough, Parfit’s repugnant conclusion
for total utilitarianism does not hold: even more, all individuals of all generations will receive
the same consumption, and therefore will enjoy the same welfare. If life spans are small enough,
even the Benthamite social welfare function would legitimate finite time extinction.
This paper is concerned with the much more essential Ramsey version of the problem,
that’s the production function is neoclassical and both capital and labor (or human capital)
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are production factors. We shall not incorporate the finite life span assumption into the story
as it has been already deeply explored in Boucekkine, Fabbri and Gozzi. Individuals have
infinite lives and there are decreasing returns with respect to labor in the production sector.
Time is continuous. To our knowledge, very few papers have tackled the optimal population
problem within this frame. Perhaps the most popular contribution along this line is Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004), section 9.2.2. Essentially, the very vast majority of papers dealing with
endogenous fertility use overlapping generations and discrete time. The seminal contribution
to this line of research is Barro and Becker (1989) and their fertility choice model within a
Ramsey structure. Typically, agents live two periods (childhood and adulthood), the utility of
children enters linearly the utility of parents but the degree of altruism is a decreasing function
of the number of children. Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s 2004 model (BSM hereafter) can be seen,
roughly speaking, as a continuous time formulation of the latter seminal model. Accordingly,
the counterpart of the number of children variable is the continuous growth rate of population,
just like in the models surveyed above on the optimal population problem.
There are two main drawbacks in the BSM. First of all, BSM do not consider the case where
the induced social welfare function is either Benthamite or Millian since their model is initially
derived from Barro and Becker (1993) where the degree of altruism is a decreasing function of
the number of children. Bringing the latter assumption to the continuous time model does not
allow to tackle an important element of the optimal population debate. This simply reflects
the fact that Barro and his coauthors have a clearly distinct focus. The second drawback is
technical: as any Ramsey model, BSM’s is not tractable. Moreover, endogenizing demographic
growth brings more nonlinearity into the problem, favoring multiplicity of stationary equilibria
and the like (a fact acknowledged, although not rigorously studied, in Barro and Becker, 1989,
pages 489-490). These issues are left in the dark in BSM.
In this paper, we take seriously the specific implications of endogenous population growth.
When we endogenize population growth decisions connecting the fertility choice with economic
variables, the Ramsey growth model experiences indeed a drastic change in its structure. The
standard discounted optimal control problem assumes that the instantaneous utility function
depends on contemporary variables alone, and that the intertemporal welfare function discounts
utility stream at a fixed exponential rate. However, the simple modification to an hyperbolic
discount function causes systematic changes in decisions which are responsible of a time incon-
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sistency in intertemporal choices. The same problem of time inconsistency appears when the
intertemporal non-separability of preferences comes from an endogenous and variable discount
function. In our model, the endogeneity of exponential population growth at a variable rate
transforms the standard optimal control problem with a constant rate of time preference, into
a new and nontrivial dynamic optimization problem, and one has to be cautious in the applica-
tion of the Pontryagin’s maximum principle. This is because the induced non-constant effective
discount rate becomes endogenous, which makes preferences intertemporally dependent. From
the literature on endogenous discounting (see for example, Obstfeld, 1990, or more recently,
Marin-Solano and Navas, 2009), we can implement a mathematical solution by introducing a
new state variable representing the accumulated stock of impatience. Then, we can solve the
transformed problem within the standard optimal control approach. The transformed is how-
ever far nontrivial as it involves a problem in higher dimension with a pure state constraint. We
handle it using the appropriate approach described for example in Sethi and Thompson (2000).
Furthermore, we study two sets of questions. One is related to the existence and uniqueness
of stationary solutions (balanced growth paths): we show that two admissible steady states
exist provided the social welfare function is not Millian; however, only one is proved to be
optimal. Last but not least, we give some insight into the short term dynamics of the model.
In particular, we numerically study the optimal demographic transitions in line with the typical
imbalance effect analysis as designed in Boucekkine, Martinez and Ruiz-Tamarit (2008).
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy. Section 3
describes the optimal growth problem and applies an appropriate maximum principle to derive
the set of necessary conditions. Section 4 analyses the long-run dynamics and characterize
the balanced growth paths as described above, including comparative statics. Section 5 is
numerical, it derives in particular some useful transitional dynamics. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The model
The model economy is a one sector closed economy. Output is obtained according to a neo-
classical production function depending on the technological level, the physical capital stock
and labor input. The latter, under the assumption of a fixed relation between labor supply
and population, will be identified with the population stock. The aggregate production func-
tion, which comes from the direct summation of the individual production functions for many
identical firms, is
Y (t) = A (t)1−βK (t)β N (t)1−β . (1)
In this function technical progress is assumed Harrod-neutral. Technological level, denoted
by A, is exogenous and evolves according to the differential equation
•
A (t) = xA (t) . (2)
This is the standard law of motion for technology in Neoclassical growth theory, where it is
assumed that technical progress arrives at a constant growth rate x ≥ 0. The solution to the
above equation implies that A increases monotonically according to the exponential form
A (t) = A0 exp (x (t− t0)) , (3)
where is A0 = A (t0) > 0 is the initial technological level.
The economy is populated by many identical and infinitely lived agents. In this context,
there is no point for differentiating between parents and children. Households face an infinite
planning horizon, representing an immortal extended family where each member can be seen as
a dynasty. Consequently, given that we focus on the link between demography and economic
growth, trying to endogenize the demographic growth in a continuous time Ramsey model, we
shall adapt the fertility conceptual schema from demographic theories to the requirements of
our own model. From an aggregate point of view, we only have to deal with two demographic
variables: population level and its variation. Population stock, denoted by N , is endogenously
determined and it evolves according to the linear differential equation
•
N (t) = n (t)N (t) , (4)
where the rate of population growth n (t) is a control variable.
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The initial population stock is N (t0) = N0 > 0, and we assume that n (t) ≥ 0 ∀t. With
respect to the individual preferences we assume that they are represented by a twice continu-
ously differentiable instantaneous utility function, which depends positively on the current per
capita consumption, and positively on the rate of population growth. The structure of our
model allows for the existence of a long-run balanced growth path, defined as an allocation in
which consumption per capita grows at a positive constant rate and the population growth rate
is constant. We assume that the particular instantaneous utility function is of the form
U (c (t) , n (t)) =
c (t)1−Φ n (t)ε(1−Φ)
1− Φ
. (5)
In this function, the parameter Φ
(
≡ c·Ucc−Uc
)
represents the inverse of the conventional in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution coefficient, which is constant and it is allowed to take
values above or below unity, 0 < Φ ≶ 1; the parameter ε
(
≡ Un
Uc
n
c
)
represents the weight of
population changes in utility relative to the weight of consumption, and it is assumed positive
but lower than one, 0 < ε < 1. According to the above parameter configuration we get Uc > 0,
Un > 0 and Ucc < 0, while we need Φ >
ε−1
ε
for Unn < 0. However, the latter parameter con-
straint always holds for Φ > 0 and ε < 1. To ensure the strict concavity of the instantaneous
utility function we assume that Φ > ε
1+ε
.1
In the present framework where population is endogenous because the stock N depends
on the population growth rate n, which is currently decided by economic agents, we omit any
population stock effect in the representation of individuals’ preferences. We consider that people
do not care about the population size N but only about the per capita number of offspring n.
That is, the stock effect is not modeled entering the instantaneous utility function as a direct
argument, but affecting other variables and functions in the model.
Finally, we introduce the aggregate resources constraint according to which output may
be devoted to consumption, to capital accumulation or to rear population changes. Strictly
speaking, here there are no parents rearing children but people looking after people. For the
sake of simplicity we do not consider capital depreciation. Hence, net investment equals gross
1This parameter constraint is a sufficient condition for the determinant of the Hessian matrix to be positive,
but also implies that Φ > ε−1ε . Consequently, the Hessian matrix is negative definite, which corresponds to the
standard sufficient condition for the utility function to be strictly concave.
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investment and the capital stock is governed by the differential equation
C(t) +
•
K(t) + bn (t)K (t) = Y (t). (6)
The initial capital stock is K (t0) = K0 > 0. Adapting from Barro and Sala-i-Mart́ın (2004),
we assume that the per capita rearing cost is b0 + b
K(t)
N(t)
, where b0 > 0 and b > 0. This cost
includes either purchases of market goods and services or the opportunity cost of time devoted to
population rearing. Then, if we consider the real number representing the change in population
size, total resources allocated to them are
(
b0 + b
K(t)
N(t)
) •
N (t) = b0n (t)N (t) + bn (t)K (t). To
obtain (6) we have simplified by setting b0 = 0.
3 The optimal growth problem
In the optimal growth problem, the benevolent planner has to consider the effect of population
size on social welfare. In this setting, given that we are not particularly interested in the case
Φ → 1 but rather in the most empirically relevant case in which Φ > 1, we define the social
welfare (which is the planner’s objective function) as
W =
∫ +∞
t0
c1−Φnε(1−Φ)
1− Φ
Nλe−ρ(t−t0)dt (7)
Parameter ρ is the positive social rate of discount or time preference. Parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]
contributes to specify social preferences, which are represented using a Millian, an interme-
diate, or a Benthamite intertemporal welfare function. In one extreme, when λ = 0 (average
utilitarianism), the central planner maximizes per capita utility (average utility of consumption
per capita). In the other, when λ = 1 (classical utilitarianism), the central planner maximizes
total utility (the addition across total population of utilities of per capita consumption).2
2The literature differentiates between two types of altruism depending on the two parameters ρ and λ. The
first one is intertemporal altruism and depends on the discount rate applied to future population utility. The
second one is intergenerational altruism and depends on the number of individuals which is taken into account
each period. In particular, for representative and infinitely lived agent models, parameter λ controls for the
degree of altruism towards total population including future generations. When agents are selfish the central
planner maximizes W under λ = 0, and population size has no direct effect on the intertemporal utility. Instead,
8
The central planner’s problem consists then in choosing the sequence {c (t) , n (t) , t ≥ t0}
that solves the optimization problem
max
{K,N,c,n}
(7) s.t. (1), (2), (4), and (6), (8)
given A (t0) = A0 > 0, K (t0) = K0 > 0, and N (t0) = N0 > 0.
Before solving the dynamic problem, we define the variables c̃ (t) = c(t)
A(t)
and k̃ (t) = K(t)
A(t)N(t)
,
which allow to write in per capita efficiency terms either the integrand and the dynamic re-
sources constraint,
•
k̃ (t) = k̃ (t)β − c̃ (t)− (x+ (1 + b)n (t)) k̃ (t).
In this context, solving equation (4) we get the following expression for the endogenous
population size
N (t) = N0 exp
(∫ t
t0
n (τ) dτ
)
. (9)
Hence, expressions (3) and (9) allow for the transformation
A (t)1−Φ N (t)λ e−ρ(t−t0) = A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 exp
(
−
∫ t
t0
(ρ− x (1− Φ)− λn (τ)) dτ
)
. (10)
This term plays the role of a variable discount factor which also depends on past and
current rates of population growth. So, adapting from Obstfeld (1990), Palivos et al. (1997),
Ayong and Schubert (2007), and Schumacher (2011) who analyze optimal control problems
extended to an endogenous discounting framework, we can define the accumulated stock of
impatience as the non-negative
∆ (t) =
∫ t
t0
(ρ− x (1− Φ)− λn (τ)) dτ = (ρ− x (1− Φ)) (t− t0)− λ
∫ t
t0
n (τ) dτ ≥ 0, (11)
where for obvious reasons ∆ (t0) = ∆0 = 0.
3 This is a new state variable for which the motion
equation reads
•
∆ (t) = ρ− x (1− Φ)− λn (t) ≡ Θ (n (t)) R 0. (12)
when agents are altruistic the central planner maximizes W under λ = 1, and the intertemporal utility function
includes total population as a determinant.
3The non-negativity of ∆ might be replaced by a weaker constraint in line with Assumption 4 in Palivos et
al. (1997) given the goal of a well-defined optimization problem.
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That is, the effective discount rate is endogenous because of the endogeneity of popu-
lation growth rates. Further, impatience is inversely proportional to the number of offspring,
Θ′ (·) = −λ 6 0 and Θ′′ (·) = 0, except for the Millian case in which we recover the standard
constant discount factor. This may happen because as population grows agents care more about
the future, given that the increased population represents an investment having a positive im-
pact on future welfare. The negative effect of population growth on the effective discount rate
is greater as higher is the intergenerational altruism. Moreover, from (12) we get
> 0 0 < n (t) < ρ−x(1−Φ)
λ
Θ (·) = 0 whenever n (t) = ρ−x(1−Φ)
λ
< 0 ρ−x(1−Φ)
λ
< n (t) .
(13)
A direct consequence of definition (11) is that the solution trajectory for population size
may be rewritten as
N (t) = N0 exp
(
(ρ− x (1− Φ)) (t− t0)−∆ (t)
λ
)
. (14)
Overall, after introducing the new variable ∆, the intertemporal optimization problem be-
comes an autonomous problem without discounting and infinite planning horizon. According
to Pittel (2002) and based on Marin-Solano and Navas (2009), due to the effective non-constant
discount rate, the Pontryagin’s maximum principle cannot be applied directly because intertem-
porally dependent preferences can create a time-consistency problem. We need this state vari-
able to solve the problem within the standard optimal control approach, where it is no use
distinguishing between present value and current value specifications. Here we follow Seierstad
and Sydsaeter (1987), Chiang (1992), and Sethi and Thompson (2000).
Then, we can write the Hamiltonian function
H
{c̃,n,q,k̃,υ,∆}
=
c̃1−Φnε(1−Φ)A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆
1− Φ
+q
(
k̃β − c̃− (x+ (1 + b)n) k̃
)
+υ (ρ− x (1− Φ)− λn) .
(15)
Here q > 0 and υ > 0 are the co-states for k̃ and ∆ respectively.4 If we ignore the constraints
4The multiplier ν represents the marginal shadow value of relaxing the constraint (12). That is, the shadow
price of (the accumulated stock of) impatience. As previously said, because of empirical reasons, we focus on
the case in which Φ > 1 and, consequently, U (c̃, n,∆) < 0. Here we choose to write H in its canonical form
with a positive sign preceding the (positive) multiplier ν.
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involving only control variables, c̃ > 0 and n > 0, the first order necessary conditions arising
from Pontryagin’s Maximum principle are
q = c̃−Φnε(1−Φ)A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆, (16)
q (1 + b) k̃ = εc̃1−Φnε(1−Φ)−1A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆ − υλ, (17)
•
k̃ = k̃β − c̃− (x+ (1 + b)n) k̃, (18)
•
q = (x+ (1 + b)n) q − qβk̃β−1, (19)
•
∆ = ρ− x (1− Φ)− λn, (20)
•
υ =
c̃1−Φnε(1−Φ)
1− Φ
A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆, (21)
Finally, we also need the initial conditions A0, N0, K0, k̃0 =
K0
A0N0
, and ∆0, as well as the
transversality conditions
lim
t→+∞
H (t) = 0, (22)
lim
t→+∞
q (t) > 0 and lim
t→+∞
q (t) k̃ (t) = 0, (23)
lim
t→+∞
υ (t) > 0 and lim
t→+∞
υ (t) ∆ (t) = 0. (24)
The necessary conditions in the present dynamic optimization problem are also sufficient
for a maximum because the Hamiltonian function satisfies the required concavity conditions
[see Appendix A]. Looking at (15) we can also check that H is autonomous. Consequently,
along the optimal path H is constant and, given that our transversality condition (22) says
that H eventually converges to zero, we conclude that
H = 0 ∀t. (25)
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Next, given the solution to equation (20) as shown in (11), which assumes ∆ (t) ≥ 0, as well
as the finite values of the strictly concave function c̃
1−Φnε(1−Φ)
1−Φ A
1−Φ
0 N
λ
0 , we can integrate (21) to
obtain the expression5
υ (t) = υ (t0) +
∫ t
t0
c̃1−Φ + nε(1−Φ)
1− Φ
A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆dτ .
Then, substituting into the transversality condition (24) we get(
υ (t0) +
∫ +∞
t0
c̃1−Φnε(1−Φ)A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆
1− Φ
dτ
)∫ +∞
t0
Θ (n (τ)) dτ = 0.
This condition holds if and only if, for any lim
t→+∞
∆ (t) different from zero,
υ (t0) =
∫ +∞
t0
− c̃
1−Φnε(1−Φ)
1− Φ
A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆dτ .
Consequently, we conclude that the multiplier ν takes the value
υ (t) =
∫ +∞
t
− c̃
1−Φnε(1−Φ)
1− Φ
A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆dτ ∀t ≥ t0. (26)
Then, the first order conditions reduce to (16)-(19) together with (11), (26), the transver-
sality conditions
0 =
c̃1−Φnε(1−Φ)
1− Φ
A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆ + q
•
k̃ + υ (ρ− x (1− Φ)− λn) , (27)
lim
t→+∞
q (t) > 0 and lim
t→+∞
q (t) k̃ (t) = 0, (28)
0 <
∣∣∣∣∫ +∞
t0
(ρ− x (1− Φ)− λn (t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ , (29)
and the initial conditions A0, N0, and k̃0 =
K0
A0N0
.
Consider now equations (16) and (17). As we have seen, gross product may be allocated
to consumption, investment, or offspring. On the margin, goods must be equally valuable if
they are consumed or accumulated as new physical capital. Namely, the marginal utility of
5The convergence of the objective integral (7) is shown in Nairay (1984), even for the case in which Φ < 1,
by proving that such a limit value exists and is finite.
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consumption today must be equal to the current shadow price qe∆ of physical capital (con-
sumption tomorrow). Moreover, at equilibrium the marginal utility of population growth must
be equal to the sum of the current implicit value of the full (rearing and dilution) marginal
cost of increasing population qe∆ (1 + b) k̃, plus the current shadow value of the accumulated
impatience scaled by the weight of the increased population in social welfare υe∆λ. Taken
together, these equations give the tangency condition
εc̃
n
= (1 + b) k̃ + λ
υ
q
, (30)
which describes the optimal allocation between consumption goods and children. The marginal
rate of substitution between n and c must be equal to the full marginal cost of increasing
population plus the degree of intergenerational altruism times the relative (shadow) prices of
impatience and physical capital.
Moreover, differentiating (16) with respect to time and substituting (19) and (20), we get
the corresponding adapted version of the Ramsey rule,
•
c̃
c̃
=
1
Φ
(
βk̃β−1 − (x+ n+ bn)− (ρ− x (1− Φ)− λn) + ε (1− Φ)
•
n
n
)
, (31)
where 1
Φ
= −Uc
cUcc
, βk̃β−1 = f ′
(
k̃
)
, ρ − x (1− Φ) − λn = Θ (n), and ε (1− Φ) = nUcn
Uc
. The
growth rate of per capita consumption in efficiency units depends: i) positively on the net
marginal productivity6 of per capita capital in efficiency units; ii) negatively on the effective
discount rate; as well as iii) on the rate of change of the population growth rate. For Φ > 1
we get Ucn < 0, which implies that c and n are gross substitutes in utility. In this case their
corresponding rates of growth are inversely related to each other. All the three above arguments
are endogenous because of the endogeneity of the rate of population growth.
Finally, for the purpose of facilitating comparison with the exogenous discount rate model,
the above Ramsey rule may be written as
6Even if we do not consider capital depreciation, the exogenous technical progress and the increase in the
population size are the cause of a marginal dilution effect which adds to the corresponding marginal rearing
cost to determine the net marginal productivity.
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•
c̃
c̃
=
−Uc
cUcc
(
f ′
(
k̃
)
− ρ− xΦ− (1 + b− λ)n+ Ucn
Uc
•
n
)
. (32)
If the net return to capital exceeds the effective discount rate, agents would decide to invest
now in physical capital leaving less resources to consumption and child rearing today. In the
standard model with exogenous discount and constant rate of population growth, this would
suffice to explain an increasing per capita consumption. However, in our model the expected
increasing resources may allow for different combinations. Obviously, the additional future
resources are available for the simultaneous growth of per capita consumption and population
size, but this is not the only possibility given that the above expression still admits an increasing
consumption with a decreasing population, or a decreasing consumption with an increasing
population. In any case, all of them will produce more future welfare.
On the other hand, differentiating (17) with respect to time and substituting (18)-(21),
we get the corresponding adapted version of the Meade rule (Dasgupta, 1969; Constantinides,
1988). This is a rule for the optimal population growth, which comes from the balance between
the gains and losses due to the introduction of a new member into society.
•
n
n
=
n
ε (1− Φ)− 1
(1 + b)
εc̃
(
(1− β) k̃β − c̃
)
+
n
ε (1− Φ)− 1
λ
ε (1− Φ)
+
ρ− x (1− Φ)− λn
ε (1− Φ)− 1
− (1− Φ)
ε (1− Φ)− 1
•
c̃
c̃
, (33)
where 1
ε(1−Φ)−1 =
Uc
nUcn−Uc < 0, (1− β) k̃
β = f
(
k̃
)
− k̃f ′
(
k̃
)
, ρ− x (1− Φ)− λn = Θ (n), and
1− Φ = Uc+cUcc
Uc
< 0. The change in the population growth rate depends: i) negatively on the
difference between the marginal product of an additional person and his consumption measured
in efficiency units; ii) positively on the degree of intergenerational altruism; iii) negatively on
the effective discount rate; and iv) negatively on the growth rate of per capita consumption in
efficiency units. It is worth noticing that again the changes in c and n are inversely related to
each other.
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Writing in terms of a more general specification, the Meade rule takes the following form
•
n =
n (Uc)
2
nUcnUn − UcUn
A (1 + b)
(
f
(
k̃
)
− k̃f ′
(
k̃
)
− c̃
)
+
n (Uc)
2
n (Ucn)
2 − UcUcn
λ
+
nUc
nUcn − Uc
Θ (n)− n (Uc + cUcc)
nUcn − Uc
•
c̃
c̃
. (34)
According to our model, when the per capita consumption exceeds the marginal product
of labor, there is an incentive for increasing the rate of population growth as well as the per
capita consumption level. Moreover, for a given degree of altruism, if the effective discount rate
is negative, the above incentive will be stronger.
4 The balanced growth path and comparative statics
In the previous section we have solved the model for any exogenous and constant rate of
technical progress. However, in the present section we assume, for the sake of simplicity, a
constant technological level, that is x=0. Otherwise, we could not find most of the analytical
long-run results associated with the balanced growth path. Hereafter we characterize the long
term equilibria identifying the balanced growth path along which c̃ and n are constant. In
steady state
•
k̃ = 0, but given the transversality condition (27) we observe that
•
∆ = ρ− λn∗ ≡
Θ (n∗) > 0, which is compatible with the constraint (29). This implies, from (11), that
∆∗ = (ρ− λn∗) (t− t0) , (35)
which makes q non-stationary according to (16). Consequently, we introduce a new variable
p = qe∆ and, hence,
•
p
p
=
•
q
q
+
•
∆. Now, in steady state
•
k̃ =
•
p = 0 and equations (16)-(19) can
be written as
p∗ = c̃∗
−Φ
n∗
ε(1−Φ)
A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 , (36)
(1 + b) k̃∗ =
εc̃∗
n∗
−
(
υ∗
q∗
)
λ, (37)
k̃∗
β
= c̃∗ + (1 + b)n∗k̃∗, (38)
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βk̃∗
β−1
= ρ+ (1 + b− λ)n∗, (39)
Moreover, from (26) or (27) we get
υ∗ =
−c̃∗1−Φn∗ε(1−Φ)A1−Φ0 Nλ0 e−∆
∗
(1− Φ) (ρ− λn∗)
=
−c̃∗q∗
(1− Φ) (ρ− λn∗)
. (40)
These expressions allow us to directly obtain the stationary values c̃∗, n∗, and k̃∗ correspond-
ing to the balanced growth path and, by substitution, all the remaining endogenous variables
of the model. After some algebraic manipulations we get
k̃∗ =
(
β
ρ+ (1 + b− λ)n∗
) 1
1−β
, (41)
c̃∗ =
β
β
1−β (ρ+ ((1− β) (1 + b)− λ)n∗)
(ρ+ (1 + b− λ)n∗)
1
1−β
, (42)
ỹ∗ =
(
β
ρ+ (1 + b− λ)n∗
) β
1−β
, (43)
where n∗ corresponds to the roots of the second degree polynomial equation with real coefficients
Ψan
∗2 + Ψbn
∗ + Ψc = 0, (44)
These coefficients depend on the structural parameters of the model in the following way
Ψa (λ,Φ, b, β, ε) = λ (((1− β) (1 + b)− λ) (ε (1− Φ)− 1)− β (1− Φ) (1 + b)) , (45)
Ψb (λ,Φ, b, β, ε, ρ) = ρ (1− Φ) (1 + b) (β − ε (1− β)) + λ (ε (1− Φ) 2ρ− ρ) , (46)
Ψc (Φ, ε, ρ) = −ρ2ε (1− Φ) . (47)
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The roots are:
n∗1 =
−Ψb +
√
D
2ψa
, (48)
n∗2 =
−Ψb −
√
D
2ψa
, (49)
where D = Ψ2b − 4ΨaΨc is the discriminant. In case D ≥ 0 the roots n?1 and n?2 are both real.
Moreover, from (40), (26), and (13) we get Θ (n∗) > 0, that is
0 < n∗i <
ρ
λ
∀i = {1, 2}. (50)
4.1 The case of the Millian welfare function: λ = 0
We first analyze the Millian case. When the central planner maximizes per capita utility
(average utilitarianism), λ = 0 and population size has no direct effect on the intertemporal
utility. It is easily checked that since Ψa = 0 for λ = 0, equation (44) has a unique solution
given by,
n∗ =
ερ
(1 + b)(β − ε(1− β))
(51)
which is positive for β > ε(1 − β). Notice that under the Millian case equation (50) is always
checked.
Substituting (51) in (41)-(43) we obtain the stationary values for k̃∗, c̃∗ and ỹ∗,
k̃∗ =
(
β − ε(1− β))
ρ (1 + ε)
) 1
1−β
, (52)
c̃∗ =
−ρ (ε− β (1 + ε))
β
1−β
(−ρ (1 + ε))
1
1−β
, (53)
ỹ∗ =
(
β − ε(1− β))
ρ (1 + ε)
) β
1−β
, (54)
17
Proposition 1 summarizes the associated comparative statics findings:
Proposition 1. When β > ε(1− β):
∂n∗
∂b
< 0, ∂n
∗
∂ε
> 0, ∂n
∗
∂ρ
> 0, ∂n
∗
∂β
< 0, ∂n
∗
∂Φ
= 0
∂ỹ∗
∂b
= 0, ∂ỹ
∗
∂ε
< 0, ∂ỹ
∗
∂ρ
< 0, ∂ỹ
∗
∂β
> 0, ∂ỹ
∗
∂Φ
= 0
Proposition 1 is trivially checked by taking the partial derivative with respect to the cor-
responding parameter in (51) and (54). In general, as we can see from the above two sets of
partial derivative signs, the optimal long-run rate of population growth and the long-run per
capita income level (measured in efficiency terms) are inversely correlated.
In particular, we can identify the following parameter-variable relationships. First, recall
that b represents the opportunity cost of parental time devoted to child rearing. Then, an
economy where parents experience a higher cost of offspring will optimally choose in the long-
run a lower rate of population growth. Note that in equation (43) we can observe two different
effects of a change in the per capita rearing costs on the per capita income level. First, an
increase in b directly reduces the resources devoted to capital accumulation, which implies a
lower long-run level of ỹ∗. Moreover, a higher b reduces the optimal population growth rate,
which has an indirect positive effect on ỹ∗. These two effects are of opposite sign and, only in
the Millian case, exactly compensate each other. Consequently, the per capita income level is
independent of b.
Second, recall that ε represents the weight of children in utility relative to consumption.
Then, a society with higher preference for children will optimally choose in the long-run a higher
population rate of growth, and will experience a lower per capita income level. Moreover, recall
that an economy showing a low ρ represents a patient society. Then, we find that in the long-
run an impatient society will optimally choose a higher population rate of growth, and will
reach a lower level of per capita income.
On the other hand, an economy with higher β is an economy with a technology implying a
higher elasticity of output with respect to capital (higher capital share). Then, in the long-run,
this economy will optimally choose a lower population rate of growth, and will have the benefit
of a higher per capita income level. Finally, we observe that in the Millian case the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, Φ, has no effect on the long run
population growth rate or the level of income per capita.
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4.2 The case λ 6= 0
When λ 6= 0, two distinct balanced growth paths emerge. We show that both are admissible
in the sense that the two associated demographic growth rates are positive.
Proposition 2. Under the parameter constraints 0 < λ 6 1, Φ > 1, and ε < β
1−β , which imply
Ψc > 0 and Ψb < 0, if Ψa > 0 then we get two real positive values n
∗
1 and n
∗
2, which are different
as long as D > 0.
Proof. We consider the most empirically relevant case in which Φ > 1 and assume ε < β
1−β .
Under these assumptions we get Ψc > 0 and Ψb < 0. Given D > 0, if Ψa > 0, we have
√
D < |Ψb|, and we can express
√
D as
√
D = |Ψb| − θ, with θ > 0. Taking into account all the
above, it is straightforward to check that n?1 =
2|Ψb|+θ
2Ψa
> 0 and n?2 =
θ
2Ψa
> 0. 
Remark 1. From Proposition 2 and using the expressions in equations (48) and (49) we get
n∗1 > n
∗
2 > 0, (55)
2Ψan
∗
1 + Ψb =
√
D > 0, (56)
2Ψan
∗
2 + Ψb = −
√
D < 0. (57)
Multiplicity of balanced growth paths cannot be a surprise in a model with endogenous
fertility. In the seminal Barro and Becker 1989 discrete time OLG model, multiplicity is possible
in the case where the cost of rearing children is large enough. In our model, the existence of
two distinct solutions is generated under much milder parametric assumptions not related to
the cost of rearing children. This said, the optimality analysis of the steady state solutions in
our model does allow to eliminate one of the two candidates, as demonstrated here below.
Proposition 3. Given the parameter constraints and the results shown in Proposition 2 and
Remark 1, the two real positive values n∗1 and n
∗
2 are separated from each other by the root’s
limiting upper-bound, implying that condition (50) does not hold for both. That is, we get
0 < n∗2 <
ρ
λ
< n∗1. (58)
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Proof. We consider the different combinations ordering the upper-bound and the two roots,
and we conclude that only one of such orderings is feasible because it is the only that requires
a compatible relationship between structural parameters.
First, ρ
λ
> n∗1 > n
∗
2. That is
ρ
λ
> −Ψb+
√
D
2Ψa
, or λ
√
D < 2ρΨa + λΨb. Then, if 2ρΨa + λΨb 6 0 the
previous inequality is incompatible because D > 0. Alternatively, if 2ρΨa + λΨb > 0 we can
square the two sides of the inequality getting the new inequality −λ2Ψc < ρ2Ψa + ρλΨb. Using
equations (45), (46), and (47) to transform into a constraint between structural parameters
alone we get 0 < −λ (1− β) (1 + b), which is incompatible.
Second, n∗1 > n
∗
2 >
ρ
λ
. That is −Ψb−
√
D
2Ψa
> ρ
λ
, or −λ
√
D > 2ρΨa +λΨb. Then, if 2ρΨa +λΨb > 0
the previous inequality is incompatible because D > 0. Alternatively, if 2ρΨa+λΨb < 0 we can
square the two sides of the inequality getting the new inequality −λ2Ψc < ρ2Ψa + ρλΨb. Using
equations (45), (46), and (47) to transform into a constraint between structural parameters
alone we get 0 < −λ (1− β) (1 + b), which is incompatible.
Therefore, n∗2 <
ρ
λ
< n∗1 is the only case which is compatible with the signs of the coefficients
Ψa, Ψb, and Ψc. 
Remark 2. Given that lim
λ→0
Ψa = 0, lim
λ→0
Ψb = ρ (1− Φ) (1 + b) (β − ε (1− β)) < 0, lim
λ→0
Ψc =
−ρ2ε (1− Φ) > 0, and consequently lim
λ→0
√
D =
∣∣∣lim
λ→0
Ψb
∣∣∣ = −ρ (1− Φ) (1 + b) (β − ε (1− β)) >
0, we get
lim
λ→0
n∗2 = lim
λ→0
−Ψb −
√
D
2Ψa
=
ερ
(1 + b) (β − ε (1− β))
> 0. (59)
which corresponds to the selfish case (see equation (51)).
Comparative statics results
Unfortunately, when λ 6= 0, the model becomes much more complex analytically speaking.
Recall that in this case the endogenous discounting is active and preferences become intertem-
porally related. The comparative statics of the optimal steady state population growth rate,
n∗2 become intractable in general. To get an immediate idea about it, let us consider the vector
of parameters Ω = (λ,Φ, b, β, ε, ρ). Then, by successive differentiation of equation (44) with
respect to the components of such a vector we get the general formula:
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∂n∗2
∂Ω
=
− (n∗2)
2 ∂Ψa
∂Ω
− n∗2 ∂Ψb∂Ω −
∂Ψc
∂Ω
2Ψan∗2 + Ψb
. (60)
Therefore, even though one can sign the terms ∂Ψi
∂Ω
where i ∈ {a, b, c}, which is not always
the case indeed, this might be unlikely to do the job. We can establish the following partial
results
∂Ψa
∂λ
= Ψa − (ε (1− Φ)− 1)λ > 0,
∂Ψa
∂Φ
= λ (−ε ((1− β) (1 + b)− λ) + β (1 + b)) > 0,
∂Ψa
∂b
= λ ((1− β) (ε (1− Φ)− 1)− β (1− Φ)) S 0 depending on whether βΦ S 1,
∂Ψa
∂β
= −λ ((1− β) (ε (1− Φ)− 1) + (1− Φ) (1 + b)) > 0,
∂Ψa
∂ε
= λ ((1− β) (1 + b)− λ) (1− Φ) < 0, because we assume (1− β) (1 + b)− 2λ > 0,
∂Ψb
∂λ
= ε (1− Φ) 2ρ− ρ < 0,
∂Ψb
∂Φ
= −ρ (1 + b) (β − ε (1− β))− λε2ρ < 0,
∂Ψb
∂b
= ρ (1− Φ) (β − ε (1− β)) < 0,
∂Ψb
∂β
= ρ (1− Φ) (1 + b) (1 + ε) < 0,
∂Ψb
∂ε
= −ρ (1− Φ) ((1− β) (1 + b)− 2λ) > 0, because we assume (1− β) (1 + b)− 2λ > 0,
∂Ψb
∂ρ
= (1− Φ) (1 + b) (β − ε (1− β)) + λε (1− Φ) 2− λ < 0,
∂Ψc
∂Φ
= ρ2ε > 0,
∂Ψc
∂ε
= −ρ2 (1− Φ) > 0,
∂Ψc
∂ρ
= −2ρε (1− Φ) > 0.
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Unfortunately, all these properties do not allow us to sign the derivative
∂n∗2
∂λ
, which is one
of the important tasks we have to accomplish as increasing λ allows to move from the Millian
to the Benthamite social welfare function. However, on gets after the appropriate substitutions
∂n∗2
∂λ
=
−(n∗2)2 ∂Ψa∂λ − n
∗
2
∂Ψb
∂λ
− ∂Ψc
∂λ
2Ψan∗2 + Ψb
=
−n∗2
2Ψan∗2 + Ψb
(
n∗2
∂Ψa
∂λ
+
∂Ψb
∂λ
)
=
−n∗2
2Ψan∗2 + Ψb
(n∗2Ψa − (ε (1− Φ)− 1) (n∗2λ− ρ) + ρε (1− Φ)) . (61)
Given (55), (57), and (58), we get
∂n∗2
∂λ
< 0(> 0)
depending on whether
n∗2Ψa < (>) (ε (1− Φ)− 1) (n∗2λ− ρ)− ρε (1− Φ) .
One can proceed in the same way for all the other comparative statics and identify sufficient
conditions for the intended properties to hold. Unfortunately, it is not possible to extract sharp
necessary and sufficient conditions. As a last example, consider the other altruism parameter
ε and try to sign the derivative
∂n∗2
∂ε
, which is expected to be strictly positive:
∂n∗2
∂ε
=
−(n∗2)2 ∂Ψa∂ε − n
∗
2
∂Ψb
∂ε
− ∂Ψc
∂ε
2Ψan∗2 + Ψb
=
−n∗2
2Ψan∗2 + Ψb
(
n∗2
∂Ψa
∂ε
+
∂Ψb
∂ε
+
1
n∗2
∂Ψc
∂ε
)
=
−n∗2
2Ψan∗2 + Ψb
(
(n∗2λ− ρ) (1− Φ) ((1− β) (1 + b)− 2λ) + (1− Φ)
(n∗2λ+ ρ) (n
∗
2λ− ρ)
n∗2
)
.
(62)
Consequently, if (1− β) (1 + b)−2λ > 0 (sufficient), then ∂n
∗
2
∂ε
> 0. Moreover, it also implies
(1− β) (1 + b)− λ > 0.
It appears clearly that when λ 6= 0, numerical exploration of the comparative statics prop-
erties is unavoidable. We shall do that together with the investigation of short-run dynamics.
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5 Numerical experiments
In this section we complement the previous analytical results with some numerical exercises.
Since the comparative statics are analytically ambiguous in the general case, we present some
numerical results in section 5.1. Moreover, section 5.2 is devoted to give some insight into the
short term dynamics of the model. We consider the following parameter values: ρ = 0.05,
β = 0.36 and Φ = 2, which roughly conform to the standard values used in the literature
(Caballé and Santos, 1993; Cantón and Meijdam, 1997). Per capita rearing cost and the
propensity to have children are given by b = 1, ε = 0.3, according to Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) and de la Croix and Doepke (2003). Finally we assume A0=1, x = 0 and fix λ = 0.5 as
the benchmark value for the altruism parameter.
5.1 Comparative statics
We first analyze how the long run population growth rate and the per capita consumption
change as the degree of intertemporal altruism increases (Figure 1). One can see that con-
sistently with Palivos and Yip, the population growth rate is decreasing with λ, that’s the
Benthamite social welfare function delivers the lowest demographic growth in the long-run.
The fact that consumption per capita is at the same time increasing with λ allows also to con-
clude that either in the AK or in the Ramsey case (with decreasing returns to both human or
physical capital) no repugnant conclusion arises under Benthamite preferences7. The Millian
case shows in contrast the largest growth rate of population and the lowest per capita con-
sumption. Nonetheless, in our calibrated model, the quantitative differences between the two
extreme cases, though significant, can hardly lead us to conclude for any opposite repugnant
conclusion.
Figure 2 shows a negative relationship between the child rearing cost and the stationary rate
of population growth. The same result is obtained in the selfish case. However, the effect
of higher child rearing costs on the long run income per capita depends on the degree of
intertemporal altruism. We proved that in the Millian case λ = 0, the long run income per
capita is independent of b. When λ 6= 0, numerical experiments show that the steady state
income per capita decreases with the child rearing cost.
7We also obtain the same result for a wide range of reasonable parameter values.
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Figure 1: Population growth rate and consumption per capita values as the altruism parameter
λ changes.
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Figure 2: Population growth rate and consumption per capita values as rearing cost b changes.
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Finally we study the comparative statics with respect to the inverse of the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution in consumption Φ. Under the Millian case (see Proposition 1), the long
run values of the relevant variables of the model are independent of Φ. However, when λ 6= 0,
an increase in the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption rises
the population growth rate in the long run. As a consequence, income per capita decreases
with Φ.
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Figure 3: Population rate and consumption per capita values as the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution Φ changes.
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5.2 Short run dynamics
We numerically study the optimal paths focusing on the typical imbalance effect analysis. We
induce a transition process choosing k0 6= k̃∗, and analyze two different situations, depending
on the position of the economy, below or above the long run value of the capital stock per
capita. In particular we set the initial condition k0 = 0.5k̃
∗ and k0 = 1.5k̃
∗ (Figures 4 and 5).
Figure 4: per capita physical capital stock and consumption
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25
Figure 5: population growth rate and per capita income
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The paths obtained can be roughly interpreted as optimal demographic transitions. When
capital per capita is below the stationary value, capital is relatively scarce with respect to labor
(or human capital). The economy starts investing massively in capital, and capital is gradually
substituted for labor. As the process of substitution proceeds forward, the optimal population
growth rate goes down leading to a kind of demographic transition (decreasing population
growth rate, increasing consumption per capita) until convergence to the stationary equilibrium.
It’s worth pointing out that these dynamics can be interpreted as imbalance effect dynamics as
depicted in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), chapter 5, or more recently in Boucekkine, Martinez
and Ruiz-Tamarit (2008). Notice also the symmetry of optimal trajectories corresponding to
initial relatively scarce capital and initial relatively abundant capital respectively. Symmetry
here is granted because we have one production sector, the shape of imbalance effects are much
less symmetric in two-sector models à la Lucas-Uzawa (see Boucekkine et al., 2008).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied an optimal population size problem of the Ramsey type in a
continuous time framework. We have motivated this problem within the population ethics de-
bate: the tricky question is not to derive optimal demographic paths but which social welfare
functions are the most appropriate to cope with intergenerational fairness. We show that our
framework does not go at odds with the early AK or AN literature dealing with these questions.
In particular, the Benthamite criterion is shown to not deliver any repugnant conclusion, neither
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in the long run nor in the short run. Indeed, within the class of social welfare functions consid-
ered, the Benthamite criterion is the one which leads with the lowest stationary demographic
growth and to the largest consumption per capita. Our contribution is also methodological.
We show that this type of problems with endogenous demography can be unambiguously con-
nected to the class of optimal control problems with endogenous discounting, and should be
therefore treated accordingly, that’s with an appropriate version of the maximum principle. It
goes without saying that this proviso applies a fortiori to any other extension of this model, for
example if one has in mind to incorporate ecological concerns into the problem. Also notice,
as already put forward by Ayong le Kama and Schubert (2007), that integrating those con-
cerns would imply an additional channel of endogenous discounting: indeed, the planner could
choose to also discount with respect to the ecological state, assigning the maximal weight to
the situations of ecological emergency.
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7 Appendix A
According to the Mangasarian’s Sufficiency Theorem the necessary conditions of the Maximum
Principle for an optimum are also sufficient if the Hamiltonian function H
(
c̃, n, q, k̃, υ,∆
)
given
in (15) is concave in
(
c̃, n, k̃,∆
)
jointly, under the proviso that the transversality conditions
(23) and (24) hold. Here, the Hessian matrix associated to the Hamiltonian function may be
written as follows
Hessian = (1− Φ)H∆∆

−Φ
c̃2
ε(1−Φ)
c̃n
0 −1
c̃
ε(1−Φ)
c̃n
ε(ε(1−Φ)−1)
n2
−(1+b)
c̃
−ε
n
0 −(1+b)
c̃
−(1−β)β
c̃k̃2−β
0
−1
c̃
−ε
n
0 1
1−Φ
 , (A.1)
where (1− Φ)H∆∆ = c̃1−Φnε(1−Φ)A1−Φ0 Nλ0 e−∆ is nonnegative.
A necessary and sufficient condition for H
(
c̃, n, q, k̃, υ,∆
)
to be concave in
(
c̃, n, k̃,∆
)
is
that the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite. Moreover, a necessary and sufficient condition
for a negative semidefinite Hessian is that the sign of the determinants known as principal minors
accommodate to the following sequence:
∼
D1 6 0,
∼
D2 > 0,
∼
D3 6 0, and
∼
D4 ≡ |Hessian| > 0.
Given the parameter constraints assumed in this model, in particular Φ > 1 and 1 >
ε (1− Φ), it is easy to show that the required concavity conditions on the Hamiltonian function
are satisfied if
c̃
k̃
k̃β
k̃
1
n2
>
(1 + b)2
ε (1− β) β
. (A.2)
This condition imposes a stronger requirement on the degree of concavity of the production
function. The above inequality, given that f
(
k̃
)
= k̃β, may be rewritten as
f ′′
(
k̃
)
6 −(1 + b)
2
ε
n2
c̃
< 0. (A.3)
In particular, given (41), (42) and (58), a sufficient condition for the required concavity
condition (A.2) to be satisfied is that 1 > βε, which always holds because of the assumed
parameter configuration of the model.
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8 Appendix B: Volterra’s derivatives
In what follows we adapt to our model the analysis from Pittel (2002), appendix to chapter 5.
Recall that the particular instantaneous utility function is of the form
U (c (t) , n (t)) =
c (t)1−Φ n (t)ε(1−Φ)
1− Φ
(B.1)
whereas the welfare function takes the following intertemporal form
W (c̃ (t) , n (t)) =
∫ +∞
t0
c̃ (t)1−Φ n (t)ε(1−Φ)A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆(t)
1− Φ
dt (B.2)
∆ (t) =
∫ t
t0
Θ (n (s)) ds (B.3)
Θ (n (s)) = ρ− x (1− Φ)− λn (s) (B.4)
Due to the structure of the exponential term, intertemporal preferences are not time-
additive. Consequently, although the marginal utilities Uc = c
−Φnε(1−Φ) and Un = εc
1−Φnε(1−Φ)−1
in (B.1) represent the corresponding changes in utility at time t, with intertemporal preferences
being recursive as in (B.2) we need the Volterra derivatives to determine the corresponding
intertemporal marginal utilities. Changes in the determinants of W will have an impact on the
current utility index but they can also affect the perception of future utility via the impact on
the accumulated discount rates with which the future utility levels are discounted.
For the sake of simplicity we can write (B.2) in a more compact form
W =
∫ +∞
t0
F (c̃ (t) , n (t)) e−∆(t)dt =
∫ +∞
t0
F (c̃ (t) , n (t)) exp
(
−
∫ t
t0
Θ (n (s)) ds
)
dt (B.5)
where
F (c̃ (t) , n (t)) =
c̃ (t)1−Φ n (t)ε(1−Φ)A1−Φ0 N
λ
0
1− Φ
(B.6)
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On the other hand, from equation (26) we get
υ (t) =
∫ +∞
t
−F (c̃ (τ) , n (τ)) e−∆(τ)dτ =
∫ +∞
t
−F (c̃ (τ) , n (τ)) exp
(
−
∫ τ
t0
Θ (n (s)) ds
)
dτ
(B.7)
and
υ (t) e∆(t) =
(∫ +∞
t
−F (c̃ (τ) , n (τ)) exp
(
−
∫ τ
t0
Θ (n (s)) ds
)
dτ
)
exp
(∫ t
t0
Θ (n (s)) ds
)
(B.8)
Then, we define the new variable
ω (t) = −υ (t) e∆(t) =
∫ +∞
t
F (c̃ (τ) , n (τ)) exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
Θ (n (s)) ds
)
dτ (B.9)
The Volterra derivative is used to determine the derivatives of the functional W near time
t, which is supplied in (B.9).
Volterra derivative with respect to c̃:
∂F (c̃ (t) , n (t))
∂c̃
exp
(
−
∫ t
t0
Θ (n (s)) ds
)
= c̃ (t)−Φ n (t)ε(1−Φ)A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆(t) (B.10)
which corresponds to the right hand side of the first order condition (16).
Volterra derivative with respect to n:
(
∂F (c̃ (t) , n (t))
∂n
− ∂Θ (n (s))
∂n
ω (t)
)
exp
(
−
∫ t
t0
Θ (n (s)) ds
)
=
=
εc̃ (t)1−Φ n (t)ε(1−Φ)A1−Φ0 N
λ
0 e
−∆(t)
n (t)
− λυ (t) (B.11)
which corresponds to the right hand side of the first order condition (17).
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